We examine the impact of maternity leaves on the period mothers are away from work postbirth, and the likelihood they return to their pre-birth employer. We use the introduction and expansion of statutory maternity leaves in Canada to identify these effects. We find that modest mandates of 17-18 weeks do not change the amount of time mothers spend out of the labor force.
Introduction
Job-protected maternity leave mandates exist in many countries, but vary widely in scope. In Europe, they are typically universal, long, and paid, while in the United States they are restricted, short, and unpaid. Internationally, the recent trend in most jurisdictions is to more generous entitlements. In the United States, many states are considering income replacement for the leaves provided under the 1993 Family and Medical Leave Act, led by California's Paid Family Leave Insurance Program which initiated paid leaves of up to six weeks in 2004. 1 The primary motivation for maternity leaves is to provide a period for the mother to fully recover from giving birth and to bond with her newborn. For example, based on available evidence the World Health Organization (2000) concludes that "women need at least 16 weeks of absence from work after delivery" to protect the health of both mother and child. Job protection over the leave provides mothers an opportunity to return to the pre-birth employer achieving career continuity over the birth event. The impact of maternity leave mandates on mothers' labor supply is therefore central to the arguments for policy in this area.
Many additional (longer term) benefits are attributed to maternity leave. These include longer periods of breastfeeding and lower accident rates in the child's first year, and for mothers better postpartum physical and mental health and improved long run labor market outcomes (e.g., Waldfogel 1998b) . While an empirical relationship between maternity leaves and these outcomes could have a variety of sources, many argue that the key mechanism is an impact of maternity leave on mothers' labor market decisions.
Existing evidence of the relationship between maternity leave and labor supply is mixed.
A central empirical problem has been finding exogenous variation in leave-taking by new 1 A summary of state initiatives up to 2005 can be found in National Partnership for Women and Families (2006) . Federally, the Department of Labor had a 'baby UI' provision from 2000-03 which allowed states to compensate maternity leaves through UI plans, although no states took advantage of this policy. mothers. Many studies use variation in leave availability across employers or leave-taking by employees. If there are unobserved differences between women with access to leaves and those with no access, then the credibility of inferences suffers. The use of more plausibly exogenous policy variation has been limited by the extent of maternity leave policy in the US and has proven difficult to exploit.
Our objective in this paper is to provide new evidence of the relationship between maternity leave and labor supply using changes in statutory leave entitlements. Our focus is Canada, where job-protected leave mandates are under provincial rather than federal jurisdiction for most workers. Mothers' leave eligibility varies by time and space rather than by their choices to match with particular employers, and is therefore less likely correlated with their unobserved characteristics. Over our sample period we observe the introduction of modest mandates (17) (18) weeks) in several provinces, followed by widespread extensions of leaves to 29-70 weeks. These policy episodes provide an attractive basis for inference. The wide range of mandates observed provides perspective on both short leaves prevalent in the US and the longer leaves available in Europe. Moreover, we are able to exploit the cross-jurisdiction and through-time variation both for mothers with new children and for control groups unlikely to be affected by maternity leave changes. We argue that this variation provides a credible, exogenous basis for inference.
Our analysis focuses on two key questions. First, do leave mandates increase the average length of time mothers spend at home with their newborns? Second, do leaves increase the proportion of mothers who return to employment with the pre-birth employer?
We have three primary conclusions. First, the introduction of modest mandates increases the proportion of mothers employed and on leave but has little effect on the length of time they are at home with their infants. Second, in contrast to the shorter leaves, mandate extensions significantly increase the period mothers are at home post-birth. Third, we find that maternity leave mandates of all lengths studied increase job continuity with the pre-birth employer.
Theory
The theoretical setting in which we interpret our empirical work comes from Klerman and Leibowitz (1997) , who explore the labor supply effects of maternity leaves in a static framework. With no mandate, employers may voluntarily offer an unpaid (or paid) maternity leave. This is a result of private incentives to preserve good employee matches and job-specific human capital. Females choose between this leave and severing the employment relationship to be at home with their child for a longer period. The cost of quitting is the difference between the current wage and the alternative wage. Females make an optimal choice given a reservation wage that declines with each month after giving birth.
A leave mandate that exceeds the employer's voluntary offer will lead some females who previously would have quit their jobs to remain employed and take the mandated leave. Also, some females who had previously taken the shorter leave offered by the employer will now take the additional weeks allowed under the mandate. Therefore the mandate will reduce the number of women quitting their jobs pre-birth to spend time at home, and clearly increase the number of women who are employed and on leave over the birth event. Importantly, the model has no definitive prediction for the average amount of time women are at home with their child, as some females take longer leaves but others take shorter leaves.
Because our analysis focuses on labor market decisions in specific months around the month of birth, it is useful to parse this last prediction from a monthly perspective. Women not at home with their child are employed and at work. In months covered both by the employer's voluntary offer and the leave mandate (e.g., the month of birth), there should be no change in the proportion employed and at work, as the mandate simply duplicates the pre-existing private arrangement. In the months the mandate exceeds the voluntary offer, the proportion employed and at work should fall. For example, if the voluntary offer is two months and the mandate four months, and assuming all leaves start at the point of birth, the proportion employed and at work should fall in months three and four. Finally, in months beyond the mandate the proportion employed and at work may rise if the mandate encourages those who previously quit their jobs, to take leave and return to their pre-birth employer.
Previous Evidence on Maternity Leaves and Labor Supply
Most previous studies of maternity leaves and the labor market are based on U.S. data.
The message of this research is mixed, but the variation of leave entitlement across mothers in the U.S. may not be ideal for identification. Historically the provision of leave by employers was voluntary.
2 Inference from this earlier period is potentially biased by unobserved differences between mothers who had access to maternity leave and those that didn't. More recently leaves have been mandated by the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), but only for employers with 50 or more employees. Waldfogel (1999) estimates more than one-half of private sector workers are uncovered. This means the law affects those most likely to have access to leave through their large employers, and presents the possibility that females sort across firms of different sizes based on their preferences for work around birth. Finally, the leave provided by the FMLA is quite short: 12 weeks. It's possible that the law simply replicates private arrangements or firm policies already in place.
Studies of the relationship between the FMLA (or state-specific initiatives that preceded it) and the employment status of new mothers often report no effect or estimates that are sensitive to specification (e.g., Baum 2003b , Klerman and Leibowitz 1997 , Waldfogel 1999 ).
An exception is Waldfogel (1999) who finds that the FMLA did increase the proportion of women with a child aged less than one who were employed and on leave, but had no effect on overall employment. Studies of the effect of leave on job continuity are more optimistic. Waldfogel (1998a) and Waldfogel et al. (1999) show that females who have access to maternity leave are more likely to return to their pre-birth employer. Baum (2003a) finds that the FMLA increased the proportion of mothers returning to their pre-birth job, but his samples are small and the effects vary in statistical significance and are sensitive to model specification.
Klerman and Leibowitz provide perspective on the job continuity results. Klerman and Leibowitz (1994) show that in the pre-FMLA era the vast majority of females who work within their child's first year of life remain employed (although on leave) over the birth event. Klerman and Leibowitz (1999) provide direct evidence (from the NLSY) that, pre-FMLA, 60 percent of females working full time before the birth of their child returned to the same employer post-birth.
This high percentage leaves limited scope for leave mandates to increase job retention unless they lead to a substantial increase in the incidence of leave.
3
Studies based on European data provide more decisive inference, although many do not directly examine the relationship between leave mandates and mothers' labor supply. There is evidence that access to leave increases job continuity . Also, that leave mandates increase the employment of females in their childbearing years (Winegarden and Bracy 1995 and Ruhm 1998) . Ruhm notes the employment effects could result from 1) higher proportions of mothers remaining employed over the birth event, 2) greater labor market participation of childless females to qualify for leave benefits when they have kids, and/or 3) new mothers returning to work sooner. Determining which of these hypotheses holds is critical for understanding the long term impact of leaves on children and mothers.
Phipps, Burton, and Lethbridge document the extent of the family gap in Canada, finding 3 Significantly, Baum (2003a) reports no effect of the FMLA and state specific mandates on the incidence of leave.
that work history cannot fully explain the gap in earnings between mothers and non-mothers. ten Cate (2000 and 2003) studies the effect of the same Canadian leave mandates studied in our paper, but focuses only on employment rates over a broad post-birth period. She reports the mandates increased the relative employment rate of females with children aged 0-2, and increased the probability of returning to work within two years of birth. 4 Our data, in contrast, allow us to focus on labor market attachment in the months around birth, providing deeper and richer evidence on the link to maternity leave policy.
Maternity Leave Mandates in Canada
Maternity leave, defined as a right to return to a pre-birth job after a specified period, is established by provincial labor standards legislation. British Columbia was the leader, prohibiting the employment of women for 6 weeks following childbirth through the Maternity Protection Act of 1921. New Brunswick was next to act in the 1960s, and the last province to introduce a mandate was Prince Edward Island in 1982. There is also federal legislation, covering those in industries regulated by the federal government. Importantly, the federal standards do not represent a 'floor' for provincial standards, since federally and provincially regulated industries are mutually exclusive.
The legislation has several common features across provinces. First, employees are protected from dismissal due to pregnancy. Second, a maximum period for the leave is always prescribed and the leave is specified as unpaid. Initially the laws of several provinces provided guidance to how the period of leave should be split pre-and post-birth, but current practice is to leave this to the discretion of the mother and employer. Third, the laws specify a minimum period of employment for eligibility. This varies widely: initially 52 weeks of employment was common, although British Columbia effectively had no requirement. The recent trend is to shorter qualification periods. Fourth, most laws specify which terms of employment are preserved during the leave and any responsibility of the employer to maintain benefits. Finally, the laws of some provinces establish rules for extending leaves due to medical complications or pregnancies that continue after term.
The maximum leave provisions of the federal jurisdiction and the provinces in the years 34 weeks in addition to the existing maternity leave. In most provinces the additional leave could be taken by either the father or mother, although in practice the vast majority of these leaves are taken by the mother. 6 The final reform is the extension of parental leave at the end of 2000, which brought the total amount of leave available in all provinces to at least 52 weeks.
Again this change was induced by a reform of the (now renamed) Employment Insurance (EI)
Act, and seven of ten provinces changed their mandates simultaneously. Quebec had already extended its mandate in excess of one year in 1997, while British Columbia and Saskatchewan did not change their mandates until early 2001. Note that the early reforms are staggered 5 It is possible that this policy variation followed the entry of women into the labor market in different provinces; that the policy change was endogenous. Many of our inferences depend on sharp, discontinuous changes in policies that are unlikely to be confounded by the more continuous changes in social trends. Beyond that, we have conducted analysis of the policy changes, finding that the female employment to population ratio does not systematically predict policy one to three years ahead. Furthermore, we have run our regressions with controls for other aspects of the work environment (unionization rates) and political environment (elections and party in power changes) and found that the inclusion of these regressors had little impact on our maternity leave variables. 6 Most provincial laws stipulate that the parental leave must be completed within a set period post-birth (e.g., 52 weeks) and must be taken immediately following any maternity leave.
through time, while the later reforms are clustered in short time-spans. We accommodate these different patterns of variation in our analysis.
Maternity leave replacement income is available to some mothers through the EI system. 
The Data
Our analysis of mothers' labor supply is based on data from the master files of the Labour Force Survey (LFS). The LFS is a monthly survey designed to provide timely information on Canadians' labor market activity. The data are collected at the individual level, but it is possible to aggregate individuals into families, and associate families with physical dwellings. The survey has a rotating panel design. Individuals belong to a rotation group that is interviewed for six consecutive months. The entrance of rotation groups is staggered so that in any month six 7 Initially, qualification for benefits required 20 weeks employment in the previous year with earnings greater than 20 percent of maximum weekly insurable earnings in each week, but since 1996 qualification has been based on hours of work. Also, in the 1970s the "magic 10" rule restricted benefits to individuals who could show that 10 of the 20 insurable weeks were from the 20 week period between the 31st and 50th weeks before the expected date of birth. This rule, eliminated in 1984, denied benefits to females who entered the labor force after conception. 8 The rate for children under 3 months is lower (25%) but this may be due to the fact that the birth occurred between the last calendar year and the survey date. We create two samples from these data. The first sample takes advantage of the panel structure of the survey to identify females who experience a birth and to examine their labor market activity in the surrounding period. All adult records include variables reporting the number of own children living at home by the single ages 0 through 24. We identify births through increments in the number of own children less than one year of age between the first and second, second and third,…, fifth and sixth months of a rotation. 9 The month this variable changes is denoted the "month of birth" (MOB). Assuming a uniform distribution of births within a given month, the survey information for the month of birth is collected when the newborn is two weeks old on average. Depending on when the birth occurs we can observe labor market status up to four months preceding or following the birth. For example, if the birth occurs between the first and second month of the rotation, we observe labor market activity in the month before the MOB and in the four months following. If the birth occurs between the fifth and sixth months, we observe up to four months before the MOB, but no months following.
With the relationship between the current month and the MOB now identified for each 9 Prior to 1996, the ages of children in the family were recorded only once, in the first month of the rotation. Starting in 1996, the ages of all children were updated every month. So, the number of children under age one could change either because a new child was born or because an existing child had his or her first birthday and was no longer under age one. We take care to distinguish the positive and negative increments in children age one so that we can accurately identify births.
female giving birth, we form sub-samples with monthly observations on labor supply for particular months over the birth event. For example, one sub-sample contains monthly observations for the MOB, while another contains the observations for one month after birth.
Because births occurring in a given calendar month will come from different rotation groups, women observed in a given calendar month will be captured at different points in the rotation.
This means we capture pre-and post-birth labor supply for subsets of the mothers having births in any given calendar month. For example, we observe labor market status three months prior to birth for only a subset of the women who give birth in, say, March 1985. This is because some of these mothers entered the survey in February (or January), one (two) month(s) prior to birth.
The second sample we create is a time series of cross sections (TSCS). We draw observations from the April and October surveys of each year. 10 Our target group is females with a child aged less than one. The advantages of this sample are that we have much larger sample sizes and that we capture women up to 12 months past the birth month, providing a broader view of any changes in leave incidence and time spent at home.
We focus on "married" (married or cohabitating) adult (aged 20-39) females. This choice is made to isolate the group of mothers who are economically independent of their parents and more likely to reside in a household with sufficient economic resources to respond to changes in leave mandates. Some partial results indicate unmarried mothers respond differently to leave mandates, but the number of these women is too small in our data to conduct a full analysis. The restriction to married women is less important for Canada than it might be for the US, as single motherhood is rarer. The exclusion of births to teenage mothers is based on the fact that this group often has stronger family ties, and so may make different decisions than older females whom we expect are more independent. 11 Again sample sizes are too small to allow a separate analysis of teenagers. Still, we are able to capture a substantial proportion of births-births to women aged 20-39 rose from 87% to 93% of all births (Statistics Canada 2006) . Overall, we estimate that our sample selection captures over 85% of births throughout much of the sample period.
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Empirical Framework
We use a variety of empirical strategies to accommodate the different types of mandate variation we observe over the sample period (see Table 1 ). We begin with the introduction of the short mandates using data from January 1976 through to October 1990. 13 The base estimating equation, for either our panel-based or TSCS samples, is
where i indexes individuals, p provinces and t months. WKSLV is weeks of mandated jobprotected maternity leave. This equation is estimated by ordinary least-squares (OLS). Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustered on province. Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004) show that clustering on the cross sectional unit improves inferences in the presence of serial correlation within-unit (i.e., province) that may arise on our context. 14 For the panel-based sample we code the WKSLV variable using the statute in effect in the month preceding the MOB. For the TSCS sample we experiment coding WKSLV either using 11 Both teen pregnancy and live births to teens in Canada are less than half the corresponding US levels (Dryburgh 2000) . 12 Direct estimates from the National Longitudinal Study of Children and Youth indicate married females aged 20-39 represented 86.3 percent of all births in the years 1994-2002. 13 This captures the introduction of 17-18 week mandates in Alberta, Newfoundland, Prince Edward Island and Quebec and the mandate extensions from 12 to 18 weeks in British Columbia and New Brunswick. 14 Hansen (2007) treats the same problem. He reports that this method produces tests of approximately correct size, but of less power than tests based on feasible GLS. The standard errors calculated with province clustering are mostly marginally larger than the estimates calculated clustering on province/year. This might be expected, as estimates of the 1 st , 2 nd and 3 rd order autocorrelations, making approximate adjustment for the fixed effects bias (Solon 1984) , are generally quite small. Cases in which the estimated standard errors are smaller than those clustering on province/year are noted as they arise in the text. the statute effective in the current month or a lagged statute. Since our sample is mothers with children aged less than one, the current statute will only be "correct" for those who gave birth very recently.
15 By lagging the statute we ensure correct coding for mothers with less recent births to discover if our results are sensitive on this margin.
Our dependent variables are 0/1 indicators that the individual is "employed and at work"
or "employed and on leave". For our panel-based data we define these variables for the MOB and for the first and second months preceding, and first through third months following, the MOB. 16 In our TSCS data they are defined for the month of observation, and record labor market status over the one year period following the date of birth.
For the panel-based data we also create indicators of pre/post-birth job continuity. This interpretation is problematic if individuals who quit their jobs pre-birth, but eventually return to their pre-birth employer, report their tenure post-birth as starting at the time of return to their job. In the appendix we investigate this issue and present evidence that individuals interpret the tenure question to ask when they initially started work with their current employer, not when the current employment period with the employer started. More detail on dependent and explanatory variables is also provided in the appendix.
We also investigate the introduction of parental leave in 1990-92, and the extension of parental leave in 2000-2001. In Table 2 we present the dates of these reforms by province.
Because in both cases many provinces moved almost simultaneously, a conventional crosssection time-series identification strategy is not effective. We therefore use a framework that compares variables of interest immediately before and after the reforms were implemented, using a variety of strategies to control for secular trends.
The estimating equation is
where POST is a 0/1 indicator that the province's leave mandate has been extended. It captures the average effect of these mandate extensions. The dependent variables are the same as in (1) with the addition of employment status captured in the fourth month following the MOB. The additional explanatory variables are the same as in (1) with the exception of the year effects.
Because there is little temporal variation in POST across provinces, year effects will absorb all the variation in the dependent variable attributable to the mandate reforms. To address this problem we exclude any controls for time but limit the data to the period immediately surrounding the reforms. For the 1990 introduction of parental leave we use the samples January We have four different strategies to investigate the robustness of our results. First, for all the reforms we compare results across samples alternatively removing workers regulated by the federal government (and therefore not affected by provincial mandates) and removing women who have not in paid employment over the previous 12 months (and therefore not eligible for maternity leave entitlement). 18 In both cases, we expect the results in these restricted samples to be stronger as measurement error in assigning the policy variable should be less. 19 Second, we also use control groups unlikely to be affected by the maternity leave reforms-married men and married childless women. We include these two control groups (one at a time) through a tripledifference model, which includes the full set of two-way interactions (province by year, province by new mother, year by new mother). We then include the number of mandated weeks of leave looking for policy effects at dates when there should be none in both the panel and time series cross section data.
The Results
We now turn to the results. We begin in Figure 1 with a simple graphical analysis of the proportions of married or cohabitating females with a child aged less than one who are employed, employed and on leave and employed and at work over the three reform periods.
Overall employment displays the well known positive trend over the period. Its components, 18 The federal sector covers federal public administration and industries such as banking, and some parts of the transportation and communication industries. Workers in this sector represent four to five percent of employment at the aggregate level. Industrial codes in the LFS (4-digit NAICS) do not allow us to uniquely identify these workers. Therefore, we delete all individuals who, as of the MOB, had current or previous (last 12 months) employment in a 4-digit industry that contained federal workers. 19 This raises the question of why those potentially not affected by the reforms are included in our main sample at all. Including the broadest possible sample allows for and measures reactions to policy such as substitution between sectors and into and out of the work force. Furthermore, our methods of identifying federal workers or mothers not eligible for maternity leave are approximations. 
Descriptive Statistics for Dependent Variables
In Table 3 we present descriptive statistics of the labor supply variables from the panel- proportion employed and at work is very low in the MOB and two months following, at ten percent or less. The complement of being employed and at work is being at home-whether it be not in the labor force, unemployed or employed on leave. So, changes in the number of women employed and at work are critical for the mandates to achieve more than mere re-labeling of time away from work.
In the second panel we present some measures of job continuity. While in the regression analysis we use unconditional measures, here we present the proportion of mothers working three or four months after the MOB with tenure greater than three or four months conditional on employment. Among those employed at 3 months, 93 percent have tenure greater than 3 months.
For four months, 89 percent have tenure greater than the time since birth. Viewed this way, Leibowitz's (1994, 1999) We now turn to our regression results for the all-province 1976-1990 panel-based sample.
In the first panel of The first column results indicate some statistically significant impacts in the months preceding the MOB-although as the succeeding columns reveal the result for 2 months before the MOB does not turn out to be robust. The estimates for the MOB and the three months following are small and statistically insignificant. However, the second column shows that a richer specification that allows for provincial trends reverses these results. There are strong secular trends in mothers' labor supply over the period (Figure 1) , and some part of it likely has a provincial characteristic. The estimate in the second month preceding the MOB is now small and statistically insignificant, but we now see statistically significant effects in all the other months surrounding birth.
To assess the economic significance of the estimates we compare them to averages of the dependent variables in the provinces that introduced mandates, over the years there was no mandate in place. 22 In the MOB, the estimate of 0.0031 per week implies that an 18 week mandate leads to a 5.5 percentage point increase (0.0031*18) in this proportion. That is, a province moving from 0 weeks to 18 weeks could expect an increase in employed and on leave of 5.5 percentage points; an increase of 31 percent compared to a pre-reform base of 18 percent.
For the third month following birth the effect is a very large nine percentage points off a base of six percent.
In the third and fourth column we implement our robustness checks by deleting federal 21 In this survey, which was conducted after leave mandates were enacted in all provinces, maternity leaves started six weeks before birth on average; four weeks at the median. In addition, newborns in the month of birth will be two weeks old, on average. The Maternity Leave Survey was an addendum to the February 1985 LFS, investigating the circumstances of maternity leaves among females whose last absence from work or last two absences (of two weeks or more) from work included one due to pregnancy. 22 We use 1976-June 1978 data for Newfoundland, PEI and Quebec, and 1976 data for Alberta.
sector workers and those without recent work. The resulting estimates without the federal sector in column three are marginally larger than in column 2, although the differences are not statistically significant. For the results focusing only on those with paid employment previous to the birth, the magnitudes of the estimated coefficients are uniformly larger. The coefficients for the months following the MOB suggest that an 18 week mandate raises the proportion of these mothers on leave between 10 and 14 percentage points, which is strongly economically significant. As noted above this is what we would expect if those eligible for maternity leave benefits are more accurately identified in these restricted samples.
As a final robustness check, we estimate triple-difference models, which include an identifiable group in the same province-year cell as the new mothers, but who we expect to experience little impact from the reforms. The reported coefficients are for the differential effect of the leave mandates on new mothers, relative to the control group. If the mandates had no independent effect on these control groups we would expect the results to be similar to those in column 2. This is exactly what we find when adding married males (column 5) as the control group, and to a lesser extent when adding childless married females as the control group in the last column. Certainly these experiments do not overturn our original inference.
The second panel of Table 4 contains results for the proportion employed and at work.
Here, the full sample of mothers (that is, not conditional on work in the past 12 months) is of particular interest, because we wish to discover whether the mandates increase time spent at home. The specifications and samples vary across columns as in the upper panel. The estimates provide little evidence that the mandates decreased work in the period surrounding birth, as most are small and statistically insignificant. The exception is when we restrict the sample to mothers with recent (paid) employment. Here, some of the estimates approach economic, although not statistical, significance. There are also some positive and significant estimates in the second month preceding the MOB, but statistical significance in this case is sensitive to the method for calculating the standard errors.
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In Table 5 we present estimates of the effect of the mandates on job continuity. The dependent variable in the first row is the proportion of females employed in the third month after birth with current tenure greater than three months. This measures the women who are still employed by their pre-birth employer. Conditional on province-specific trends, the estimates for WKSLV are all positive and mostly statistically significant. In the second column, an 18 week mandate is estimated to raise the proportion by about 6 percentage points off a pre-mandate base of 21 percent. We note this is a second case where the inference is sensitive to the method of calculating standard errors. For example, clustering on province/year yields estimates that are at most marginally statistically significant.
There is a consistent statistically significant negative effect on the proportion leaving a job within the 12 months preceding birth, and it is driven by exits for personal or family reasons.
This seems to correspond well with a maternity leave interpretation. In the second column, an 18 week mandate lowers the proportion by roughly 5.5 percentage points (off a pre-mandate base of 35 percent). This estimate roughly matches both the increase in the proportion of these women employed at 3 months after the MOB with their pre-birth employer, and the increase in the proportion employed and on leave for this specification from the first panel. The estimated change is ten percentage points for the sample who worked in the 12 months preceding birth, which is perhaps the more appropriate sample since those who were not working have no job to leave.
In Table 6 we present estimates from the TSCS sample. This exercise cross-validates our 23 In this case, clustering on province produces substantially smaller standard errors than clustering on province/year.
panel inference and provides better perspective on the average amount of time mothers are at home with their infants. Because the sample contains all mothers up to a year post-birth, it captures both those who might take longer leaves as a result of the mandate, and those who might take shorter leaves.
The results are consistent with the estimates from the panel data. First, there is evidence of an effect on the proportion of mothers employed and on leave: the 0.0014 coefficient in column 2 implies that an 18 week mandate raises the proportion 2.5 percentage points. Second, estimates for the proportion employed and at work are mostly small and uniformly statistically insignificant. This indicates no change on average in the period mothers are at home in the first year. Third, we obtain larger estimates for employed on leave in the restricted sample of those with recent work. We present results coding WKSLV to current and three month lagged mandates, the latter matching the mandate to mothers with three month old children. The estimates are not sensitive on this margin.
These results provide strong and robust evidence that the introduction and initial expansions of leave mandates in the 1970s and 1980s led to increased leave taking. However, we find no consistent evidence that women switched to leaves from being employed and at work.
Instead, the evidence suggests that women staying at home with their child switched from leaving their jobs to taking leave. Importantly, this finding provides no basis to expect any consequent change in the infants' or the mothers' health, since time at home does not change.
We also find a sharp decrease in job separations, which is accompanied by an increase in retention of the pre-birth job. This indicates that the introduction of leave may help females preserve job specific human capital over the birth event.
An Extension of Mandated Leave: the 1990 Introduction of Parental Leave
The introduction of parental leave starting in 1990 extended the amount of job-protected leave available to new mothers from 17-18 weeks to 29-52 weeks. To motivate our results, in To study the extension of leave, we employ equation (2) first using our panel-based sample. We try different time windows to check the sensitivity of results. In the first two panels of Table 7 we report estimates of POST for the proportions employed and on leave and at work.
Given the results in Table 4 , we focus on months in which mandated leave was most likely unavailable before the extension in order to save space: three and four months following the MOB. (Estimates for months preceding the MOB, a time when an effect is also possible, are uniformly statistically insignificant.) The results in the first column are from data for 1990 and 1991. There is strong evidence of an increase in leave and-in stark contrast to the results for short leave mandates-an offsetting decrease in work at four months after birth. The estimates indicate offsetting changes of more than ten percentage points. This suggests a substantive change in behavior rather than a simple re-labeling of time off work from not employed to on leave. The extension of the mandate increased the time spent away from work.
In the next column the sample is July 1989 through December 1992. This bigger time window picks up the reform in Newfoundland and provides longer periods to establish the preand post-reform levels. There are significant increases in leave in both the third and fourth months following birth and offsetting decreases in work. There is also a very modest decrease in work in the MOB.
Comparing the results to averages of the dependent variables in all provinces in the period just before the reform (July 1989 -October 1990 , the 15.6 percentage point increase in leave in the fourth month following birth (column 2) is off a pre-reform base of 21 percent. The 12.6 percentage point decrease in the proportion at work is off a base of 30 percent. These are large effects, indicating a large increase in the proportion of women at home with their children.
In the third column we check for spurious inference using a falsification exercise. Using data from July 1986 through 1989 we code the changes in the provincial mandates as if they occurred three years earlier than the date of the true enactment. We therefore expect the estimates of POST from this sample to be zero, and so this falsification exercise will provide evidence of the sensitivity of the identification strategy to secular trends. As expected, the estimates are almost uniformly small and statistically insignificant, the exception being some effect in the second month before the MOB. The next two columns contain results for our restricted samples deleting federal workers or women who have not worked in the past year.
Consistent with the analysis of the previous reforms the point estimates for the third and fourth months following the MOB from the sample of mothers with recent works tends to be larger.
The final two columns contain the triple-difference results. Again the estimates support our original inference although the effect is larger using childless females as a control group..
In the final panel of Table 7 are the results for job continuity. They indicate a significant increase in the proportion of mothers employed with their pre-birth employer in the fourth month following birth. The nine percentage point increase in column 2 for being employed at MOB+4
with the pre-birth employer can be compared to a pre-reform base of 41 percent. In contrast there is little evidence of an increase in job continuity at the third month post-birth. This might be expected because the mandates in place prior to the 1990 reforms provided up to 18 weeks of leave. This would extend to three months post-birth for women who initiated leave just prior to birth. Finally, there is a modest decrease in the proportion leaving a job in the 12 months preceding the MOB for family reasons, which is marginally statistically significant in some specifications. Note that the estimates from our falsification exercise (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) According to the theory discussed earlier, the expected source of increased job continuity is females taking the mandated leave and remaining with their pre-birth employers instead of quitting their jobs and staying out of the labor market. However, the overall change in employment (netting employed at work against employed and on leave) for MOB+4 in the second column of Table 7 is only (15.6-12.6) 3 percentage points, while the increase in those returning to the pre-birth employer after four months in the second column of Table 8 is over 9 percentage points, leaving a mysterious 6 point gap.
To investigate this, we created a binary indicator for the extension of leave and regressed an employment indicator for the MOB+4 month on the leave indicator, along with control variables. The coefficient on the leave indicator is reported in the first row of Table 8 -it is 0.0299 for the full sample. We then run the same regression on subsamples defined by the length of job tenure. First is for those with tenure greater than 4 months, which means the mothers returned to the pre-birth employer. The estimate of 9.11 percentage points recreates the 6 point gap outlined above (9.11-2.99).
The remainder of the table resolves the mystery. The estimates indicate a strong shift away from tenures 2 to 4 months, meaning that some women who previously were returning to work with other employers now return to the pre-birth employer. Such a shift might occur if these mothers preferred a gradual return to the labor market after birth to immediate full time employment, but could not negotiate this arrangement with their old employer. The extension of parental leave allows them to put off full time employment to a more acceptable time. To check this story, in the last row of Table 8 we report that the change in part-time work at tenures less than 5 months is -3.9 percentage points, or about two thirds of the total change in employment at short tenures. So, a sizeable proportion of the increase in job continuity comes from women who otherwise would have discarded their previous employment match to take part-time employment when their child was quite young.
In Table 9 we turn to the results using the TSCS sample. In addition to confirming the results seen in Table 7 , these TSCS results provide a basis for comparison with the results below from the 2000 extension for which only the TSCS sample can be used. We only present results using the leave mandate in the current month, but the results using a six month lag are very similar. There is consistent evidence of a three or four percentage point increase in the proportion employed and on leave, and corresponding decline in the proportion employed and at work. Note that the estimated impact on work is smaller in the triple difference specification.
Baker and Milligan (2005; Figure 5 ) argue this is due to larger impacts of the 1990 recession on the employment of males and childless females that net out the reduction in work of the mothers.
Overall, if the mandate extension led some women to spend less time at home, this effect is more than offset at the average by women who increased their time at home.
24
24 As a further check on inference we have re-estimated our models for both the panel-based and TSCS samples using another identification strategy. We add a polynomial in time to equation (2) and expand the sample to 1988-1994. This is like a regression discontinuity design in which all effects of time, except the mandate reforms, are assumed to be smooth functions. For the panel-based data these estimated effects are very similar for the fourth month following the MOB, but generally smaller for other months. For the TSCS data the results indicate a two to
To summarize these results for the 1990 extension, we find a large response in being employed and on leave in the 3 rd and 4 th months after birth, which is mostly offset by a corresponding decrease in being employed and at work. This suggests that the extension of the mandate led to more time available for new mothers to spend with their children, and therefore provides a basis for an impact on children's wellbeing. For job continuity, we find a moderate increase in women returning to their pre-birth employer, split between women who pre-extension would have exited the labor force and those who otherwise would have taken new, mostly parttime employment when their child was young.
An Extension of Mandated Leave: the 2000 Extension of Parental Leave
Our final evidence comes from the extension of parental leave at the end of 2000 to one year in all provinces except Quebec, where leave had been extended to 70 weeks in 1997. The impact of this reform is clear in Figure 1 . In 2001 we see a dramatic, discontinuous increase in the proportion of mothers with a child aged less than one who are employed and on leave, and an offsetting decrease in the proportion employed and at work.
The extension of leave from roughly six to twelve months in most provinces is outside the span of observation of our panel-based data, which only extend to four months after the MOB. We therefore focus on our TSCS sample. We code the policy variable in two ways: with the current mandate from the month of the observation or with a 9 month lag. Since mothers observed in early 2001 with a child less than 12 months old were not eligible for the full year of leave, using the current mandate introduces measurement error. However, since in this sample we do not always know the month of birth, it is not possible to assign the correct mandate with complete accuracy for any 2001 observation. So, we show the results with two different three percentage point increase in the proportion on leave, and a modestly smaller decrease in the proportion at work. In either case the results are very robust to specification of the time effects as linear, a quadratic or a cubic. These results are available from the authors on request.
assignments to check sensitivity.
The estimates appear in Table 10 Since the extension is to one year of leave and the TSCS sample is mothers with a child aged less than one, these results cannot establish whether time spent at home post-birth went up on average. Mothers who before the extension quit their jobs and stayed at home more than one year may now take a shorter leave. We have re-estimated our models, however, for the sample of women whose youngest child is aged one and find no effect of the extension on the labor supply of this group. 25 Therefore, it appears the number of mothers shortening their time at home is negligible. This suggests that, like the 1990 reform, the 2000 mandate extension led to more time for mothers at home with their young children. 25 The estimates are very small, statistically insignificant and available on request.
Conclusions
We investigate the relationship between mandated job-protected maternity leave and the labor force behavior of mothers with newborns. The analysis reveals that mandates can increase the time mothers spend at home with their infants and the likelihood they return to their pre-birth employer. Importantly, the increase in the time at home post-birth is a result of the longer mandates that we analyze. No effect is found for the shorter mandates (17-18 weeks) that most likely duplicate existing private arrangements. However, this difference in our conclusions by leave length must be qualified by the fact that the shorter and longer leave mandates date from different time periods. The increase in job continuity over birth is found for mandates of all lengths analyzed.
We also find that the increase in job continuity associated with longer mandated leaves comes from two sources. Some women come back to the work force instead of permanently quitting in order to care for their child. Another large share switches from taking new mostly part-time jobs while their child is young to taking longer leaves before returning full-time to the pre-birth employer.
As noted in the introduction an impact of maternity leave on labor supply is thought to be the mechanism through which these leaves can have longer term benefits such as better labor market outcomes for women and better health outcomes for children. Whether maternity leaves have these impacts remains an important task for future research.
Our results also may explain the lack of consistent evidence of an impact of short mandates, such as the FMLA, on labor supply. In our data these short mandates appear to replicate the private arrangement females can make in the absence of legislation.
An issue left unresolved by our analysis is how the labor supply effect of leaves varies with income replacement. The responses to this question indicate that individuals interpret this question to mean first start working at this employer rather than the start of the current job or employment period. There are at least two striking results here. First, the overwhelming majority of mothers working in the third or fourth month following birth report a job tenure indicating they are with their pre-birth employer. Second, a substantial fraction of those who were not employed in their MOB also report a job tenure that indicates they are at their pre-birth employer: 51 percent of those working in the third month following birth and 41 percent of those working in the fourth.
This suggests that these individuals interpret the tenure question to ask when they first started work with their current employer, not when the current employment period with the employer started.
Variable Definitions and Sources
Labor Supply Analysis
WKSLV:
Weeks of mandated job-protected maternity/parental leave. Source is provincial statues and Labor Canada (Various Issues).
Education: 0/1 indicator that the individual has completed some postsecondary education but not a degree; 0/1 indicator that the individual has completed a university degree. Source is LFS.
Other Child: 0/1 indicator of the presence of another child aged one or greater living at home. Source is LFS . 18  18  1991  41  18  30  34  29  17  34  35  34  52  18  1992  41  18  30  34  29  29  34  35  34  52  18  1993  41  18  30  34  29  29  34  35  34  52  18  1994  41  18  30  34  29  29  34  35  34  52  18  1995  41  18  30  34  29  29  34  35  34  52  18  1996  41  18  30  34  29  29  34  35  34  52  30  1997  41  18  30  34  29  29  34  35  34  70  30  1998  41  18  30  34  29  29  34  35  34  70  30  1999  41  18  30  34  29  29  34  35  34  70  30  2000  54  18  52  54  54  52  52  52  52  70  30  2001  54  52  52  54  54  52  52  52  52  70  52  2002  54  52  52  54  54  52  52  52  52  70  52 Notes: Sources are provincial statutes and Labor Canada (Various Issues). The Federal statutes apply in the federal public sector and federally regulated industries. 1990-1991 1989-1992 1986-1989 1989-1992 1989-1992 1989-1992 1989-1992 Federal Delete Recent Work Yes Control Group Males Childless Females Notes: Reported statistics are the parameter on a 0/1 indicator of the introduction of parental leave from a regression of the indicated variable on leave indicator, province and calendar month effects, a cubic in age, education (three categories) and a control for siblings aged 1-24. Robust standard errors, clustered on province/year, are in parentheses. Sample period as indicated. MOB is month of birth. Y ear 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 199 4 1995 1996 0 .25 .
.75
Notes: Source is the panel-based sample from the LFS. The proportion reported is for the provinces of British Columbia, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island and Quebec. Y ear 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 199 4 1995 1996 0 .25 .5 .75 Notes: Source is the panel-based sample from the LFS. The proportion reported is for the provinces of British Columbia, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island and Quebec.
